A History of Violence in the French Revolution by Gueniffey, Patrice
908 https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2018.315
Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2018. Т. 63. Вып. 3
© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2018
A History of Violence in the French Revolution
P. Gueniffey 
For citation: Gueniffey P. A History of Violence in the French Revolution. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg 
University. History, 2018, vol. 63, issue 3, pp. 908–916. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2018.315
The aim of the French Revolution was to reform the Old Regime of absolute monarchy ac-
cording to the principles of Enlightenment. It succeeded but also brought about terrible fits 
of violence. This contradiction had always challenged the judgement of the contemporary 
witnesses as well as the reflection of subsequent historians. Was it the result of a fortuitous 
drift due to the circumstances (fierce resistance of the counter-revolution, unexpected conflict 
with the Church, unwished wars with European monarchies)? Was it an expression of the 
barbaric standards of the people under the Old Regime? Or was it a necessary consequence 
of the very option of a radical rational revolution? This article demonstrates that violence was 
inevitable but the circumstances made it much worse. Four unexpected events contributed to 
the radicalization of the Revolution: the decree of the 27th November 1790 on the reorgani-
zation of the Church; the flight of Louis XVI to Varennes (20−21 June 1791); the election of 
inexperienced new deputies in the Legislative Assembly which succeeded the “Constituante” 
in October 1791; the declaration of the war to Austria on 20th April 1792. Nonetheless, above 
all, in a completely new context the competition for power and the ill-fated role played by a 
limited group of publicists triggered, the disastrous spiral which led to the Terror.
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Цель Французской революции состояла в преобразовании абсолютной монархии ста-
рого порядка в соответствии с принципами Просвещения. Революционеры преуспели 
в достижении заданной цели. На смену старому политическому и социально-экономи-
ческому режиму пришло новое государственное устройство, однако достижение на-
меченных преобразований сопровождалось ужасающими вспышками насилия. Явное 
противоречие между благородными посылами и низменными средствами их достиже-
ния всегда вызывало интерес со стороны как современников, непосредственных сви-
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детелей событий, так и последующих историков. Можно ли объяснить это противо-
речие случайным отступлением от идеалов буржуазно-демократической революции, 
продиктованным силой обстоятельств (ожесточенное сопротивление контрреволю-
ции, неожиданный конфликт с церковью, незапланированные войны с европейскими 
монархиями)? Или же упомянутое противоречие явилось выражением варварских 
нравов людей, выросших и сформировавшихся при старом порядке? Или его следует 
считать необходимым следствием самого выбора радикальной рациональной револю-
ции как инструмента борьбы с изжившими себя государственными устоями? Автор 
статьи показывает, что насилие было неизбежным, но  обстоятельства придали ему 
грандиозный масштаб. Четыре непредвиденных события способствовали радикализа-
ции революции: Декрет от 27 ноября 1790 г. о гражданском устройстве духовенства; 
бегство Людовика XVI в  Варенн (20−21  июня 1791); избрание неопытных депутатов 
в Законодательное собрание, пришедшее на смену Учредительному в октябре 1791 г.; 
объявление войны Австрии 20 апреля 1792 г. Тем не менее приходится констатировать, 
что в  наибольшей степени в  том совершенно новом контексте, в  котором пребыва-
ли революционеры, именно борьба за власть и злополучная роль немногочисленной 
группы публицистов имели следствием катастрофическую спираль, которая привела 
к Террору.
Ключевые слова: Французская революция, насилие, Террор, публицисты, Робеспьер, 
Марат.
Francois-Noёl Babeuf who was not yet known as Gracchus, happened to be in Paris 
at the time of the storming of the Bastille. He saw the first acts of violence of the French 
Revolution. He saw the mob lynch the governor of the fortress and flood the streets of 
Paris. He, who was to be a prophet of communism, was astonished by so much savagery. 
He could understand the delight of those who howled at the victims, who had been their 
“oppressors”, when they went by, but he could not share it. He writes to his wife a few days 
later: “So much joy made me sick! I was at once satisfied and displeased… I do approve of 
such justice when it contents itself with the suppression of the guilty, but how should it not 
be cruel today? Such a variety of torments, quartering, torture, the wheel, the stake, flog-
ging, the gallows, executioners everywhere, have given us such bad morals! Instead of civ-
ilizing us, the masters have made us barbarous because they are themselves barbarous”1.
There is a well-known word by Talleyrand, according to whom, one could have no 
idea of “la douceur de vivre”, if one had not lived in the last years of the Ancien Régime. It 
might be true if he meant the society Talleyrand knew and moved in. Beneath the thin ve-
neer of the exquisite social habits of the Siècle des Lumières lay violence. If there was such 
a trauma in July 1789, and again in October, when a mob came from Paris to attack the 
Palace in Versailles and slaughtered several guards, this is because the urban ruling class 
had long forgotten how brutal country people and town workers could be. Two worlds had 
existed side by side, ignoring one another; even two different humanities, according to the 
philanthropist Artur Young, who visited France on the eve of 1789. And yet a foreboding 
event could have provided a warning: the riot which sacked the Réveillon wallpaper fac-
tory in April 1789. The soldiers had much trouble repressing the rioters, dozens of whom 
died.
1 Lettre de Babeuf à sa femme du 23  juillet 1789  // Advielle V. Histoire de Gracchus Babeuf et du 
babouvisme. 1ère éd. Rééd. Paris, 1990. P. 54.
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But it was all forgotten in the wake of the meeting of the General States. Everyone 
revelled in optimism, under the illusion of the society which had united around the king 
and the delegates of the nation. Few people understood which forces had been liberated 
in the hectic days of the spring and summer, and how difficult it would be to control them 
in the future. For men like Babeuf, such unfortunate events were just a consequence of 
the past, which would soon be mitigated by enlightened politics, well-calculated reforms, 
amendment of injustice and education of the people.
As the months passed, however, one had to face the facts. Far from receding, violence 
rose everywhere. But as late as 1792, Rabaut-Saint-Etienne, a member of the Constituent 
Assembly who would be guillotined a few months later, said it again loudly and clearly: it 
was not the revolution which should be made responsible for so many victims, but what 
remained of poverty and barbary in French society. In other words, the Ancien Régime 
was concerned, not the Revolution, and if the Revolution took another course than first 
imagined, its principles, its ideals, its values were not questioned. The blood that had 
been shed proved nothing; it rather gave an additional justification to the Revolution, 
which would ultimately eradicate the very root all causes of violence2. Even Condorcet 
kept by the same theory until his suicide in 1794: the inheritance of the Ancien Régime 
explained everything, whereas the Revolution was not guilty of the crimes perpetrated 
in its name. 
It was a mixture of social and political violence which started before 1789 as all offi-
cial structures collapsed in the turmoil of the elections to the General States. The positive 
political passions of the Revolution — faith in liberty and equality — covered less worthy 
social passions: resentment, vengeful feelings, tabula rasa conceived as the triumph of 
the poor over the rich. Among hundreds of newly created newspapers, the most radical 
ones were the most popular. “L’ami du peuple” set the tone and expressed some of most 
powerful popular passions, not the daily newspapers which tried to start a parliamentary 
press in France similar to that existing in Britain. Marat was indignant, critical, pointed 
accusatory finger, suspected of treason those who tried if not to stop but to slow down the 
revolution. He was indeed the voice of the Revolution and if not the “friend” of the people, 
at least the interpreter of their instincts. More than the politicians, deputies or Jacobins, 
a small group of the journalists bore a heavy responsibility for the early drift of the Revo-
lution. Words cost nothing to journalists, but they can bring them quite a lot. They were 
a crowd of adventurers or embittered people who found an opportunity to assuage their 
hatred and, perhaps, to build a fortune. They would not have played such a part if the 
times of Enlightenment had not put the writer on a pedestal and made him the voice of 
public opinion. The political discussion had taken a literary color which was to be of great 
consequence during the Revolution. “The people imbibed the temper and disposition of 
the authors with their principles. ˂…˃ The whole nation acquired, by dint of reading 
them, their instincts, their mental complexion, their tastes, and even their natural defects. 
When the time for action came, men dealt with political questions on the basis of literary 
principles. The student of our revolution soon discovers that it was led and managed by 
the same spirit which gave birth to so many abstract treatises on government. In both he 
finds the same love for general theories, sweeping legislative systems, and symmetrical 
laws; the same confidence in theory; the same desire for new and original institutions. 
2 Rabaut-Saint-Etienne J. P. Précis historique de la Révolution francaise. Paris; Strasbourg, 1792. P. 6–7.
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˂…˃ A terrible sight! For what is a merit in an author is often a defect in a statesman, and 
characteristics which improve a book may be fatal to a revolution”3.
Since Voltaire the writers had come to the fore, and this was true not only of Voltaire 
or Diderot, but also of those who grew later like weeds in the shade of the giants: Fréron, 
Marat, Hébert, Camille Desmoulins. At a time when public opinion, which the writers 
claimed to represent, had become a principle, and the people — a source of all truth 
and all legitimacy, one cannot wonder if a profession so little respected — and usually 
despised, as Max Weber wrote later — as that of the journalists, played such a part well 
beyond its own triviality. So that beside the barbarous, uneducated, almost wild people, 
whose outbursts of violence punctuated the course of the Revolution, other barbarians, 
educated ones, stirred up the fire, doing their best to push up the Revolution. As a dis-
appointed Barnave confessed, short before being executed, the moderate had never had 
the least influence on the events, staying always behind and vainly trying to hold up the 
march of the revolutionary column which they could but follow reluctantly4. 
However, the steady rising of violence did not result only in a mechanical process 
of radicalization. Circumstances played a decisive part too. They increased fears as well 
as the temptation to find scapegoats for whatever did not work, that is, for almost every-
thing. Four occurrences which brought about the violent course of the Revolution were 
of special importance5. 
First, it was the decree of 27, November, 1790, that compelled all members of the 
clergy to swear fidelity to the Constitution, which appeared schismatic to many of them, 
including those who had approved of the reorganization of the Church and the national-
ization of Church estate. This fateful decision added to the political passions unleashed 
by the Revolution, those passions which are inherent to religious convictions. As a result, 
the men of 1789 had to go the way of violence, so massive was the refusal to take the 
oath. 
The second event was the flight of the king to Varennes (20–21 June 1791) which 
opened the question whether the monarchy should be maintained or not. It created an 
abyss under the feet of the deputies at the very moment when the National Assembly was 
on the verge of closing its work and giving France its first constitution. 
The third unfortunate circumstance was the almost incomprehensible fact that the 
deputies decided on the 16th May 1791 to exclude themselves from their own succession. 
To remove from the new institutions those who had written the Constitution and ac-
quired in the last three years an irreplaceable experience was to put the destiny of France 
in inexperienced hands, but also in the hands of all those who, in newspapers or clubs, 
made no mystery of their intention to overturn a Constitution which they found to be 
not revolutionary enough and too accommodating to the past. 
Last but not least, the declaration of the war to Austria, on 20 April 1792, swept 
along not only the monarchy — Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette were suspected to have 
3 Tocqueville A. de. The Old Regime and the Revolution /  transl. by John Bonner. New York, 1856. 
P. 179–180. 
4 Gueniffey P. Terminer la Révolution  ? Barnave et les feuillants //  Gueniffey P. Histoires de la 
Révolution et de l’Empire. Paris, 2011. P. 151.
5 Gueniffey P. La politique de la Terreur: essai sur la violence révolutionnaire 1789–1794. Paris, 
2000 (russian edition 2003).
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secret communications with the enemy, which was not false-, but the very possibility of 
bringing the Revolution to an end. 
After the fall of the monarchy (10 August 1792), the Constitution of 1791 did not 
mean anything more. Another one was written by the “Convention Nationale” but it 
was not even tried: after being solemnly adopted, it was locked up in a cedar ark and 
shelved till the peace. As the country was invaded from all sides, that meant forever. 
Since the massacres perpetrated in the prisons in September 1792, Revolutionary France 
had changed. Indeed, there was an assembly, which possessed great theoretical powers. 
In fact, it fulfilled none. Authority was in the hands of a whole series of more or less 
official committees, competing with one another and largely ignoring the instructions 
they got from Paris — from the Convention, the ministers, the “députés en mission” and 
even from the “Commune de Paris” who had become since September 1792 a State in 
the State. 
In this anarchical context where, according to Barras, one guillotined for fear of be-
ing guillotined, the “Tribunal révolutionnaire” appears first as an island of wisdom. It will 
change. Several generations of revolutionaries have already disappeared: “monarchiens” 
of 1789, “feuillants” of 1791, “girondins” of 1792, “enragés” of 1793. The revolutionary 
stage empties, the prisons are full of suspects, captured emigrés, priests and all those who 
a neighbor or debtor wants to get rid of. The time of the great massacres has started in 
Lyon, Toulon, the Vendée. The figures are controversial. One speaks of 40 000 victims. 
But this does not take into account all the victims of the civil war in the West, summary 
executions, drownings, grapeshot shooting or the “infernal columns” of general Turreau. 
Altogether, if one adds to the victims of the repression those of the civil war in the West, a 
figure of 300 000 victims is more likely.
The Revolution had lost its compass. How can it be explained? The circumstances, of 
course. Then, the obliteration of public authority that had been so long associated with the 
person of the king: becoming democratic, it had not recovered its capacity of arbitrating 
conflicts and imposing rules. But these factors are not sufficient enough to properly ex-
plain the drift of the Revolution, nor is the existence of an ideology of violence, to which 
the supporters of Counterrevolution have always tried to reduce the Terror.
Of course, rebuilding society on a new rational basis without any relation to the past 
or to tradition was fraught with violence. “Our history is not our code” proudly proclaimed 
Rabaut Saint-Etienne in 17896. Such principles meant a total rupture with ancient insti-
tutions, long-established habits. It meant uprooting immemorial beliefs and ingrained 
practices, and teaching new ones to the people who were to be reinvented, so to speak. 
That could not have been done without using force. Edmond Burke predicted as soon as 
1790, in the midst of what is considered the “happy year” of the Revolution, the year of the 
“Fête de la Fédération”, that France was running if not towards disaster, at least towards 
unheard-of violence7. The revolutionary passions, voluntarism — the idea that there is no 
limit to the efficiency of human will — and artificiality — the idea that a society resem-
bles a soft dough and can be shaped and reshaped from the basis to the top upon purely 
rational principles — such ideas would soon lead to massacres perpetrated in the name of 
an abstract People against the real people. The following events proved Burke was right. 
6 Rabaut-Saint-Etienne J. P. Considérations sur les intérêts du Tiers État adressées au peuple des 
provinces par un propriétaire foncier. 1ère éd. 1788. Nouvelle édition. Paris, 1826. P. 11.
7 Burke Ed. Reflections on the Revolution in France. London, 1790. 
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Yet the use of the word “ideology” cannot explain much in this case. According to 
Alain Besancon, “ideology is a systematic doctrine which promises hail to the converted; 
which gives itself as consonant with a cosmical order; which claims scientific certainty; 
which determines a political praxis aiming at a total transformation of society in confor-
mity with its immanent model which the doctrine has discovered. The field of ideology is 
politics. It is a dated phenomenon, the genesis of which needed exceptional circumstanc-
es”8.
But does not the French Revolution promise hail through history, a promise which 
can lead to much violence through the absolution of the present crimes by the happy fu-
ture? This is true but those times ignore the science of society even in the degraded form 
of slogans, they ignore the necessary complement of ideology, its practical form — the 
party. Nothing is more distant from Bolshevism than Jacobinism. The latter never built 
a party invested with a doctrine and a discipline of action. Jacobinism is inferior to its 
reputation. It never embodied itself in a party: it is more the field or the stage on which 
parties and factions confront themselves to get hold of the legitimacy which Jacobinism 
embodies due to the circumstances of the birth of the first clubs in 1789; and to achieve, 
armed with this legitimacy, their special purposes. There is a Jacobine discourse, but it is 
not homogeneous and can’t become a doctrine. Its object is not the nature of democracy: 
it is more the means of the Revolution than its ends.
In the light of this, the Jacobins of 1793 keep to the principles of 1789: to use Marxist 
words, the bourgeois society, individualist and liberal, remains their horizon, even if at 
various points, the tone will be more “social”. The Jacobine discourse on individual and 
sovereignty is in reality a discourse on Revolution and, more precisely, on Revolution as 
total war with no other outcome than “victory or death”. It is a discourse on democracy 
at war that brings the principles of democracy — rights of individuals, liberty, rule by 
law, separation between between the public and private spheres — to such a degree of 
incandescence that in the end they reverse into the opposite. War, according to Tocque-
ville, kills democracy. Not only because it necessarily increases the power of the govern-
ment, but also because by making people get used to violence and servitude, it eventually 
leads to despotism. War actually means enlistment, giving up every form of autonomy 
and individual reason. War creates a social order in which the individual does not exist 
anymore, an order in which the individuals by renouncing themselves, giving up all that 
distinguishes and separates them in normal times, achieve a sort of absolute equality. The 
Jacobine discourse is the theory of the democratic individual thrown into a total war with-
out any possible negotiated outcome9.
That brings us to the last factor among the possible explanations of the Terror. The 
French Revolution, as most revolutions, started with a proliferation of speeches. As if be-
fore pouring blood, the revolutions had to produce words, speeches, a flood of speeches, 
all the more radical as they don’t have to submit to the requirements of reality. This stream 
of words deals only with one thing: the nature and aims of the Revolution. As a result, 
all these speeches go one way: that of a constant overbid. The word “Revolution” has no 
steady meaning. It is a vague promise of liberty and happiness that opens an unlimited 
8 Besançon A. Les origines intellectuelles du léninisme. Paris, 1977. P. 143. 
9 Cochin A. Les sociétés de pensée et la démocratie moderne: études d’histoire révolutionnaire. Paris, 
1921; Kennedy L. M. The Jacobin clubs in the French Revolution. Princeton, 1982. See also: Furet F. Penser 
la Révolution francaise. Paris, 1978. P. 212–259. 
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space to speculation. Every new definition of the Revolution, as soon as it is formulated, 
can be challenged by other definitions that will radicalize its aims. There lies the cause for 
the revolutionary “hubris” which, through a series of overbids in the definition of the aims 
and the choice of the means, leads to violence through a dynamical process of cumulative 
radicalization of the discourse. 
All these speeches emulating in violence tend to occupy the most advanced position 
in order to conquer legitimacy and get hold of power. The only justification for power, in 
this context, is the ability to impose one’s interpretation of the meaning of the Revolution 
as the only true and legitimate one. A fragile justification, since it can be contested in the 
name of other, still more true and legitimate definitions. As a result, each of the competing 
actors must constantly occupy the most advanced position in order to overtake the others: 
each one must continuously justify himself by demonstrating in words and actions that 
he is more revolutionary than the most revolutionary among his rivals. Outbidding is a 
necessity, and violence — a necessary consequence inasmuch as one outbids to the detri-
ment of the enemies, real or alleged, of the Revolution.
Adrien Lezay-Marnésia gave a vivid description of such dynamics: “Popularity is the 
greatest force of popular parties, and persecution of the adverse party — the best means of 
popularity. No wonder that they rivaled for popularity, and that rivalry made war all the 
more determined against all enemies of the Revolution. Everyone, in order to get more 
popular than his rival, had to outdo him in violence, and the vanquished, to clear himself 
of the suspicion of complicity which his rival would throw on him, tended to overbid him 
in severity”10. 
Competition for power through conquest of revolutionary legitimacy is all the more 
ferocious as since 1792, the French revolution was not restricted by any form of legality, 
since after overthrowing the Ancien Régime, it overthrew the constitution it had elabo-
rated with such pains. Together with that constitution, the very idea of law had collapsed. 
The insurrection of 10 August 1792 had substituted the reign of force with that of the law. 
Overthrowing a constitution by violence means devaluating from the start every future 
legality and setting as a principle that the will of the people, or rather the will of those 
who claim to speak in its name, is superior to any contract or commitment: what has been 
overthrown today will be overthrown tomorrow for the same reason. 
From now on, no procedure whatsoever determines the way to confer power: it be-
longs to those who know how to present themselves as the embodiment of revolutionary 
legitimacy. Moreover, it is not only some authority, defined by the constitution or laws, 
which can be taken, but unlimited power, since the monarchy has been overthrown. The 
collapse of legality, added to the opening of an unlimited space to ambitions, lets violence 
loose. Every party can hope to take the prize, but once it is won, it is not protected any-
more by law, so various competitors, being unable to produce an unquestionable title for 
their supremacy, must destroy rival claims, proving by their own excesses that their rivals 
are moderate and false revolutionaries.
The French Revolution has invented — at least partially — the modern idea of revo-
lution: permanent; independent of the ends it has given itself; conceding legitimacy only 
to the most radical of its protagonists.
10 Lezay A. Des causes de la Révolution et de ses résultats. Paris, An V–1797. P. 22. 
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It had started with a view to “regenerating” France, which meant bringing order into 
its government and giving it laws. Now it had no other purpose than itself, attacking re-
ligion, considering taking children from their parents to make them citizen soldiers like 
in Sparta, making the use of the “tu” compulsory, destroying every symbol of the Ancien 
Régime, wrecking the royal graves in Saint-Denis, killing in a measure unseen since the 
religious wars in the 16th century. Caricatures of the time show France turn into a large 
cemetery and the executioner forced to behead himself because there are no clients left.
This situation could have lasted a long time if the Terror itself had not provided a 
solution. In March and April 1794 Robespierre who until then had always avoided moving 
away from the most extremist, suddenly exposed himself and stroke. He had a good rea-
son: the Hebertist faction wanted to “dechristianize” France, and attacked him personally, 
as he believed religion was necessary to social order. With the help of Danton he put an 
end to the antireligious masquerades and then, using Danton against Hebert and Hebert 
against Danton, he sent both to the scaffold. 
Posterity has not acknowledged enough this great political coup which threw Robe-
spierre into power and permitted him to concentrate all the means of power within a few 
weeks. From April to July 1794, he could exercise a real dictatorship, and Napoleon — 
who was quite a Robespierrist at the time — would keep on asserting he succeeded where 
Robespierre had failed. The difference is that Napoleon could lean on the military, whereas 
Robespierre had to count on committees and militants, many of whom had sympathized 
with Hebertism. Moreover, Bonaparte knew what he wanted when he snatched power. No 
one knows what the exact intentions of Robespierre were; he took the secret with him into 
his grave. All he did was to start a fight against those who, like Carrier and Fouché, had 
“exaggerated” the terrorist measures. He took control of the repressive system and passed 
a bill — known as the act of 22 Prairial, 10, June, 1794 — which centralized justice in Paris, 
mechanically increasing the number and the rhythm of the executions. This weapon was 
essentially intended to eliminate one day all kind of opposition or resistance inside the 
National Convention, because the act of 22 Prairial suppressed all form of parliamentary 
immunity. At the same time, as the military situation suddenly improved, Robespierre, 
who could not justify his dictatorship by circumstances anymore, appealed to religion and 
the will of God. His colleagues saw in it a vague and indefinite menace. Would he kill all 
the atheists as some of his lieutenants suggested? 
In the end, did he wish to end the Revolution by ensuring for himself a monopoly of 
terror, or was he swept away by the utopia of a virtuous society from which all the wicked 
would have been removed? Was he a profound politician or a fanatical revolutionary mes-
siah? The question is still open, and the mystery of Robespierre’s personality and action 
remains11.
Once the Incorruptible was dead, the Terror was doomed. Robespierre was so closely 
associated with the idea of revolution, he embodied so purely the image of “Revolution’s 
excess”, according to Michelet, that no one could succeed him. There could not be a “new 
Robespierre”. By his virtuous rhetoric, he tried to give a new future and a new aim to the 
French Revolution: not only to destroy the old world, but to create a new man. But while 
he celebrated the new cult dedicated to the Supreme Being and his own idea of the perfect 
republic, the circumstances radically changed. The French armies, which had been de-
11 Gueniffey P. Histoires de la Révolution et de l’Empire. Paris, 2011. Ch. VII and VIII. P. 217–302.
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fending the threatened borders for a long time, now settled in Amsterdam. The Fatherland 
was no longer in danger. It was no more 1793. Of course, it was not yet over with violence. 
There were retaliations, new purges. The spirit of civil war had gone too far, the spirit of 
institutions could not easily get the upper hand. In 1793, in the course of a harsh debate 
in the Convention, Legendre, who had been a butcher, tried to tear Lanjuinais down from 
the platform. “I will stun you like an ox if you don’t come down”, said he. — “You should 
first decree that I am an ox”, replied Lanjuinais12.
One had come so far. It is not surprising that fifteen years of authoritarian Bona-
partist regime were necessary, after ten years of Revolution and turmoil, to put an end to 
that queer habit of killing one another that had taken possession of the French.
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